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During 2015, Mr Stransham-Ford, who was terminally ill at the time, 
approached the Pretoria High Court on an urgent basis.[1] The relief 
that he sought was nothing short of a medicolegal earthquake: Mr 
Stransham-Ford requested the Court to develop the common law 
to legalise voluntary active euthanasia – at least in his specific case. 
The case was opposed by, among others, the Minister of Health and 
the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA). The legal 
arguments of both sides centred on constitutional rights – in particular, 
the right to human dignity, the right to life, and the right to control one’s 
body. In a judgment that caused much sensation and controversy, the 
Pretoria High Court decided in Mr Stransham-Ford’s favour. However, 
in a Shakespearean twist of fate, Mr Stransham-Ford died of his illness 
a few hours before the judgment. This twist of fate proved to be decisive 
in the subsequent appeal,[2] as it raised the question: Was the Pretoria 
High Court competent to adjudicate the matter after Mr Stransham-
Ford’s death? The Supreme Court of Appeal answered this question 
with a definite ‘no’, and upheld the appeal against the Pretoria High 
Court’s judgment primarily on this technical ground. Consequently, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal did not engage with the arguments for 
and against the legalisation of voluntary active euthanasia. As such, the 
figurative jury is still out on the merits of the various legal arguments 
for and against voluntary active euthanasia.
The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment is probably the end of the 
road for the Stransham-Ford lawsuit, as the death of Mr Stransham-
Ford is an obstacle that will also stand in the way of a possible appeal 
to the Constitutional Court. Yet this may only be the first chapter in 
a longer saga of voluntary active euthanasia legal reform in South 
Africa (SA). One possibility for chapter two is that Parliament may 
take up the issue and initiate new legislation – this was held by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal as the ideal solution. However, the ruling 
party may prefer to avoid getting entangled in this issue and therefore 
rather decide to leave it to the courts.
Whether or not Parliament decides to take up this issue, nothing 
prohibits civil society organisations that favour the legalisation of 
voluntary active euthanasia from initiating public interest litigation in 
an attempt to succeed where Mr Stransham-Ford as (deceased) private 
litigant has ultimately failed. It might even be that a future Minister 
of Health and HPCSA management may change their position on the 
subject and simply abide by the decision of a future court. However, 
what is certain is that a number of civil society organisations will 
oppose the legalisation of voluntary active euthanasia, and take up 
the gauntlet of litigation.
Although the issue of legalisation of voluntary active euthanasia 
was not finally adjudicated in Stransham-Ford, the case provided 
a forum for a comprehensive rights-based debate on the issue. As 
such, Stransham-Ford can serve as a learning opportunity for future 
discourse on the subject of voluntary active euthanasia. In this article, 
I intend to make use of this opportunity. From the papers filed 
with the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Stransham-Ford appeal, I 
identify three pertinent conceptual errors concerning human dignity, 
and in each instance propose a corrective principle to guide future 
discourse. I focus on human dignity because of its central position 
in the discourse on voluntary active euthanasia in general, and the 
special attention that it received in the High Court judgment and 
in the papers filed with the Supreme Court of Appeal. My focus on 
human dignity should not be interpreted as denigrating any other 
relevant right. The purpose of this article is not to advocate any final 
position on the issue of voluntary active euthanasia, or to consider 
factual questions such as the efficacy of palliative care in managing 
pain in some or all cases. Instead, my purpose is more confined, 
namely to contribute to greater conceptual clarity regarding human 
dignity. In the following paragraphs, I first present a brief analysis of 
the meaning of human dignity, before I analyse the conceptual errors 
pertaining to human dignity and suggest corrective principles.
What is human dignity?
A conceptual distinction must be made between ‘human dignity’ and 
‘dignity’. Human dignity is best understood as a specific species of 
dignity that denotes the objective value inherent to all humans. Other 
notable species of dignity in Western philosophy are the following: 
This open-access article is distributed under 
Creative Commons licence CC-BY-NC 4.0.
The issue of voluntary active euthanasia was thrust into the public policy arena by the Stransham-Ford lawsuit. The High Court legalised 
voluntary active euthanasia – however, ostensibly only in the specific case of Mr Stransham-Ford. The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned 
the High Court judgment on technical grounds, not on the merits. This means that in future the courts can be approached again to consider 
the legalisation of voluntary active euthanasia. As such, Stransham-Ford presents a learning opportunity for both sides of the legalisation 
divide. In particular, conceptual errors pertaining to human dignity were made in Stransham-Ford, and can be avoided in future. In this 
article, I identify these errors and propose the following three corrective principles to inform future debate on the subject: (i) human dignity 
is violable; (ii) human suffering violates human dignity; and (iii) the ‘natural’ causes of suffering due to terminal illness do not exclude the 
application of human dignity.
S Afr Med J 2017;107(5):383-385. DOI:10.7196/SAMJ.2017.v107i5.12339
MEDICINE AND THE LAW
Human dignity and the future of the voluntary active 
euthanasia debate in South Africa
D W Jordaan, PhD
School of Law, Howard College, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa
Corresponding author: D W Jordaan (mail@donrichjordaan.law.za)
384       May 2017, Vol. 107, No. 5
IN PRACTICE
Firstly, dignity as subjective self-value; secondly, a behavioural 
conception of dignity, which denotes the objective value that an 
individual possesses based on certain behavioural qualities that are 
associated with dignity, such as composure, calmness, and a noble 
manner; and thirdly an aspirational conception of dignity that 
denotes the objective value that an individual possesses based on his 
or her accomplishments in life. The species of dignity that is relevant 
to human rights analysis – and therefore discourse on the legalisation 
of voluntary active euthanasia – is human dignity.
Our Constitutional Court has refrained from specifically defining 
human dignity, but the meaning of human dignity has gradually crys-
tallised through the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence, as entailing 
the following inter-related components:[3]
• An individual is an end in himself or herself.
• All individuals are entitled to equal concern.
• An individual is entitled to a space for self-actualisation.
• An individual is entitled to self-governance or autonomy.
• Individuals are collectively responsible for the material conditions 
for individual agency.
The component of human dignity that stands out as relevant to the 
voluntary active euthanasia debate is an individual’s entitlement 
to autonomy. The High Court in Stransham-Ford relied heavily on 
human dignity, and adhered to the meaning of human dignity qua 
autonomy.
In the following paragraphs, I analyse the conceptual errors 
concerning human dignity made in the papers filed with the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, and propose corrective principles.
Principle: ‘Inherent’ does not mean 
‘inviolable’
The first conceptual error that emerges in the papers filed with 
the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Stransham-Ford appeal is the 
interpretation of the inherent status of human dignity as meaning 
that human dignity is inviolable. The relevance to the debate about 
voluntary active euthanasia is that if human dignity is inviolable, it 
follows that human dignity would not be affected by illness, restraints 
on autonomy, etc.
The interpretation of human dignity as being inviolable is incorrect. 
The inherent nature of human dignity means that all humans can claim 
protection of their dignity by virtue of being human; however, the 
inherent nature of human dignity does not mean that human dignity 
is incapable of violation. One can recognise that a person’s human 
dignity is violated by a certain event, while simultaneously holding 
that the person has human dignity. Recognising a violation of human 
dignity does not equate to postulating a person-without-human-
dignity. This analysis and conclusion is implicit in constitutional 
cases that dealt with the violation of the human dignity of a person 
(or, depending on the case, a group of persons).[4-6]
Principle: Human suffering violates 
human dignity
The second conceptual error does not insist on the inviolability 
of human dignity in general, but asserts that suffering in particular 
does not violate human dignity. The assertion is typically stated as 
‘suffering is not undignified’ (expert opinion by Dr Cameron, filed 
in Stransham-Ford[2]). This assertion confuses human dignity with 
other philosophical species of dignity. A terminally ill patient might 
carry herself with great composure despite her suffering – an instance 
of behavioural dignity. However, in the context of a human rights 
analysis, the species of dignity that is relevant is not behavioural 
dignity, but human dignity. Human dignity entails that an individual 
is entitled to autonomy. Autonomy, in turn, means that every person 
should be able to pursue his or her own idea of the ‘good life’,[7] but 
while there may be a great many ideas of the ‘good life’, it can safely be 
stated that suffering is nobody’s idea of the ‘good life’, and hence that 
suffering is antithetical to autonomy. Accordingly, as a general rule, 
suffering violates human dignity.
Principle: ‘Nature’ is no immunisation 
against human dignity
The third conceptual error is that human dignity as a normative 
construct does not – and cannot – protect persons against nature. 
The argument proceeds as follows: Given that terminal illness and the 
suffering associated with it are natural occurrences, human dignity 
has no application to such illness and suffering, and cannot be used 
to justify voluntary active euthanasia in such context.
While some aspects of nature are indeed beyond human control, 
other aspects are well within our power to control. To the extent that 
an aspect of nature is within human control, it enters the normative 
sphere. One aspect that is within our power to control is to provide 
palliative care; another aspect that is within our power to control 
is to allow voluntary active euthanasia. Accordingly, the context of 
terminal illness and suffering at the end of human life is appropriate 
for the application of human dignity.
Excursus on ‘nature’ and ‘natural’
In Stransham-Ford, the arguments against voluntary active euthan-
asia were often based on the implicit notion that dying of a 
‘natural’ death has moral value, or is at least morally superior to 
self-determining the time and way of one’s death. This implicit 
notion is a version of the belief that ‘natural’ is morally good, while 
‘unnatural’ is morally bad, or at least morally inferior. The logical 
conclusion of this belief is that the entire enterprise of medical 
science amounts to an immoral attempt to counter the natural 
course of pain and death caused by nature in the form of illnesses. 
After all, it is natural for cancer to be painful. Clearly, this belief that 
‘natural’ is morally good, and ‘unnatural’ is morally bad is a fallacy. 
The philosopher Karl Popper states as follows in his book The Open 
Society and Its Enemies:[8]
 ‘Nature consists of facts and of regularities, and is in itself neither 
moral nor immoral. It is we who impose our standards upon 
nature, and who in this way introduce morals into the natural 
world, in spite of the fact that we are part of this world.’
Accordingly, the fact that death occurs ‘naturally’ due to a terminal 
illness has no inherent moral content. But the human decision to 
force terminally ill persons to die a ‘natural’ death – despite the 
suffering caused in the process of ‘natural’ dying to the patients 
and their loved ones – does have moral content. Furthermore, any 
argument that juxtaposes the palliative care approach with voluntary 
active euthanasia, and posits the palliative care approach – and in 
particular, continuous sedation – as moral, and voluntary active 
euthanasia as immoral, based on the fact that the former allows 
nature to run its course regarding the timing of death, while the 
latter allows human determination of the time of death, is fallacious. 
Care should be taken that future discourse on the legalisation of 
voluntary active euthanasia should not relapse into the appeal-
to-nature fallacy. If the palliative care approach is to be preferred 
above voluntary active euthanasia – even contrary to a patient’s 
autonomous desire for euthanasia – logically valid reasons must be 
provided.
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Conclusion
The focus of this article was on human dignity in the discourse on 
voluntary active euthanasia. It bears repetition that human dignity 
is not the only right that is relevant to this complex discourse. 
The question of whether or not voluntary active euthanasia is 
required by SA’s human rights system must be answered by carefully 
balancing all rights that are relevant to the subject. Still, human 
dignity remains essential to any rights-based analysis of voluntary 
active euthanasia. Accordingly, conceptual clarity regarding human 
dignity is important, and the post-Stransham-Ford voluntary active 
euthanasia discourse would be enhanced by avoiding the conceptual 
pitfalls of the past.
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